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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals in Section
78-2a-3 of the Utah Code.
MATVRS Of THE PPQggEDTNGS
This

appeal

is

taken

from

a

final

judgment

of

criminal

conviction on June 16, 1989 imposed after jury trial by the Third
Circuit

Court,

Sandy

Department,

Honorable

Robin

W.

Reese

presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT
FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS.
II. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTION 3-114 FOR VAGUENESS WHEN HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ORDINANCE
15 VAGUE AS TO HIS CONDUCT.
III. WHETHER SECTION 3-1-14 IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
IV.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE
STATEMENT INTO EVIDENCE.

DEFENDANT'S

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES AND RULES
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City. Section 3-1-14.
(a) Attacking dogs. It shall be unlawful for the owner
or person having charge, care, custody or control [of] any dog
to allow such dog to attack, chase, or worry any person, any
domestic animal having a commercial value, or any species of
hoofed protected wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. Worry
as used in this section shall mean to harrass [sic] by
tearing, biting or shaking with the teeth.
(b)
Owner liability.
The owner in violation of
subsection (a) above shall be strictly liable for violation
of this section. In addition to being subject to prosecution
under subsection (a) above, the owner of such dog shall also
be liable in damages to any person injured or to the owner of
any animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby.
(c)

Defenses.

The following shall be considered in

2

mitigating
charge:

the penalties
(1)

or damages or

in dismissing

That the dog was properly confined

the

on the

premises•
(2)

That the dog was deliberately or maliciously

provoked.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On January 27, 1989, Sandy City charged the defendant by

Information with Dog Attacking Persons or Animals under Sandy City
Ordinance 3-1-14.
2.

The date of the violation was December 24, 1988.

transcript

before

the

Court

of

Appeals

contains

no

The

evidence

concerning the events of that date nor any evidence of events
previous to that date concerning the ownership of the dog.
3.

After the date of violation but before the charge was

filed, Diana Albrand, a Sandy City animal control officer, called
the

defendant

and

inquired

as

to

a

convenient

time

that

a

representative from animal control could come to the defendant's
home or work to speak with him.

Because of scheduling conflicts,

the defendant agreed to come to the animal control office to fill
out a statement.
4.

Transcript, p. 6,

When he arrived at the office, Diana Albrand told him that

he was under no obligation to write the statement and clarified
this position by giving the defendant a partial Miranda warning.
The defendant was not placed under arrest and was free to leave at
any time.
5.

Transcript, p. 6-7, 17.
The defendant told the officer that his dog had been

3

running between his residence and a Mrs. Mauldin's and then
expressed confusion about what to write in the statement.

The

officer responded, "Just write what happened and, you know, who
owns the dog and who doesn't own the dog."
6.

Transcript, p. 7.

The officer went into a back room to do other work while

the defendant filled out the statement.

When the defendant was

finished writing the statement, he voluntarily handed it to the
officer and, after the officer expressed appreciation, said "okay"
and left.
7.

Transcript, p. 8.

The case first came before the trial court on March 16,

1989 for the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's written
statement.
8.

The Honorable Philip K. Palmer denied the motion.
The trial was heard by jury on June 16, 1989, the

Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding.

The jury found the defendant

guilty and the judge ordered restitution.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Brief of Appellant should be stricken under Rule 24

of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

The brief contains a

number of factual allegations which are not supported by citations
to the transcript.
proceedings

would

Furthermore, a complete transcript of the
show

that

some

of

these

allegations

are

inaccurate.
2.

Even if the brief is not stricken, the defendant does not

have standing to challenge Section 3-1-14 for vagueness.

The

litigant challenging a law must show that it is vague either in
all its applications or at least as applied to the litigant's
4

conduct.

The defendant has shown neither.

Subsection (b) of the ordinance states clearly that owners of
dogs are strictly liable for a violation of subsection (a) which
prohibits dogs from attacking persons or other specified animals.
The ordinance is, therefore# not vague in all its applications.
Furthermore, the defendant has not shown that the ordinance is
vague as to his conduct because there are no facts appropriately
before the court upon which the court could reach that conclusion.
3.

Even if the defendant has standing to challenge the

ordinance for vagueness, the ordinance is not vague.

Subsection

(a) gives notice to owners of a dog as well as people having
charge# care, custody or control of a dog that they may not allow
that dog to attack persons or animals.

"Allow" is commonly

understood to include passive conduct; it does not necessitate
intent or knowledge.
Thw average person would understand from the language of the
ordinance that he is responsible

for the conduct of his dog

regardless of whether he was aware of the activities of dog.
Otherwise, the purpose of the ordinance to protect the public
welfare would be defeated.
4.

The written statement of the defendant was properly

admitted by the trial court.

The circumstances

in which the

statement was given were not subject to Miranda protections because
they were neither custodial nor interrogative.

The defendant came

freely to the animal control office to give the statement, wrote
the statement and offered it to the animal control officer freely,
5

and left the office freely.
ARGlftJENT
I.
THE BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE IT IS
DRAFTED IN VIOLATION OF RULE 24 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS.
The

Brief

of

Appellant

contains

a

number

of

factual

allegations which are not supported by references to the record.
This is not a matter of a simple failure to cite to facts contained
in the transcript.

The transcript excludes entirely the evidence

leading to and on the date of the violation.

Nevertheless, the

defendant, in his Statement of the Case and elsewhere in his brief,
liberally alleges facts from the trial without offering the court
the benefit of determining their accuracy. The only portion of the
brief

which

cites

to

the

transcript

is the

admissibility of the defendants statement.

section

on the

Brief of Appellant,

p. 14-16.
Rule 24(k) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals permits
the court to strike briefs which are not drafted in compliance with
the rules.

The Brief of Appellant does not comply with Rules

24(a)(7) and 24(e) which require facts to be supported by the
record.

When

facts alleged

on appeal

are not

supported by

citations to the record, the reviewing court will assume the
correctness of the ruling below.

White River Shale Oil v. Public

Service Commission, 700 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1985).
Rule 24(k) also permits the court to strike briefs which
contain inaccurate information.

The defendant's version of the

facts contains inaccuracies, but it is difficult for the plaintiff
6

to show these inaccuracies without the missing portions of the
transcript.

However, at least two examples of inaccuracy can be

offered by way of the defendant's own written statement. Appendix
1.
The defendant states that he took his dog to animal control
to be adopted or destroyed.

Brief of Appellant, p. 4-5.

This

assertion is directly contrary to the defendant's own written
statement that the dog "vanished" in September and then returned
with a new collar and tag.

Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7.

The

defendant also makes statements that leave an impression that after
September the dog was with him only periodically.
Appellant, p. 5.

Brief of

But these statements contradict the defendants

admission that at some point he had the dog for a month and a half
and that after this time he never had a problem with the d o g —
apparently a problem with him leaving—until December 25th when he
disappeared.

Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7.

II. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTION 31-14 FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE
ORDINANCE IS EITHER VAGUE IN ALL ITS APPLICATIONS OR VAGUE AS TO
HIS CONDUCT.
A person engaging in conduct which is clearly proscribed by
a law in question "cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine
the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law." Village of Hoffman v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The litigant asserting vagueness has
the burden of showing that the law in question is vague either in

7

all its applications or at least as applied to the
conduct.

litigant's

Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Sections 12-32, at

1036 (2d ed. 1988).
The defendant has failed to show that the ordinance is vague
in all its applications.

The ordinance establishes clearly that

an owner is strictly liable for a violation of the ordinance.
Subsection (b) states that "the owner in violation of subsection
(a) above shall be strictly liable under this section."

Subsection

(b) further clarifies that strict liability applies not only to
damages but to prosecution for the offense itself:
In addition to being subject to prosecution under
subsection (a) above, the owner of such dog shall also
be liable in damages to any person injured or to the
owner of any animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby.
In at least one circumstance, therefore, the ordinance is entirely
clear.
The defendant has also failed to show that the ordinance is
vague as to his conduct.

The transcript before the Court of

Appeals excludes all testimony presented at trial.

The record on

appeal, therefore, is devoid of the facts which would allow the
defendant to argue or the court to conclude that the ordinance is
vague as to the defendant's conduct.
Even if the application of the ordinance is limited to owners
and the court accepts the defendant's allegation that he was not
the licensed owner of the dog at the time of the offense, the
defendant has failed to establish that he was not the owner as that
term is commonly understood.

Therefore, he has not shown, nor are

8

there sufficient facts for the court to find, that he was not the
owner of the dog and thus not subject to the clear language of
subsection (b).
III. SECTION 3-1-14 IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE SUBSECTION
(A) BOTH BY ITS LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY ON
OWNERS AND OTHERS HAVING CHARGE, CARE, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF A DOG.
The central issue of this case is whether Section 3-1-14 is
void for vagueness. All of the defendant's issues, except the one
concerning

the

defendant's

statement,

can

be

answered

by

a

resolution of the issue of vagueness.
The standard in Utah for determining whether a law is void
for vagueness is that the law must be "sufficiently explicit and
clear to inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what
conduct is prohibited."

State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah

1987) . But in reviewing a law under this standard, the court must
consider other important guidelines.
First, "legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of
validity." Hoffman, at 505. Second, "neither absolute exactitude
of expression nor complete precision of meaning can be expected."
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981).
defense,

therefore,

that

on

hindsight

there

It is not a
may

be

other

constructions of the law in question.
Third, the degree of scrutiny with which a court considers a
law depends on whether the law reaches constitutionally protected
conduct.

If its does, the degree of notice must be greater than

for other conduct so that the there is no chilling effect on
constitutionally protected activities.
9

In such cases, the law is

subject to close judicial scrutiny. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379 (1979); Rotunda, Constitutional Law. Section 17.8, at 262, n.
22

(1986).

Laws

related

to

activities

which

are

not

constitutionally protected are subject to a less strict test for
vagueness.

Flipside. at 498.

Before examining the language contained in Section 3-1-14, it
must

be

determined

protected conduct.

whether

the

law

It does not.

reaches

constitutionally

The purpose of dog control

ordinances is to protect the public, not deprive one the right of
property.
(1989) .

McQuillan,

Municipal

Corporations,

Section

24.284

The mere fact that a law tangentially affects property

does not invoke close scrutiny.

Otherwise, economic regulations

would not be subject to a less strict vagueness test.

Flipside,

at 498; See also United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S.
29, 36 (1963) (distinguishing the approach to a vagueness challenge
in a case involving an economic regulation from the approach to
cases arising under the First Amendment).
The rights with which courts are most concerned under a claim
of vagueness are those specifically protected by the constitution.
The concern for a law which regulates speech, for example, is that
uncertainties in the law may chill one's right to freedom of
speech.

It can hardly be said that any unclarity regarding a

personfs responsibilities for restraining a dog produces a chilling
effect on constitutional guarantees.
Section 3-1-14 is clear that the owner of a dog is strictly
liable if that dog attacks, chases, or worries a person or animal
10

specified in the ordinance*

The question is whether a person

having charge, care, custody, or control of the dog is also
strictly liable.

An analysis of this question must focus on

Subsection (a):
It shall be unlawful for the owner or person having
charge, care, custody or control [of] any dog to allow
such dog to attack, chase or worry any person, any
domestic animal having a commercial value, or any species
of hoofed protected wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl.
Subsection

(a) , even without the clarification

added by

Subsection (b) , is clear that people other than the owner, as
specified in the ordinance, are strictly liable.

The use of the

word "allow" in subsection (a) does not leave confusion as to
whether knowledge or intent is required. "Allow" means "to forbear
or neglect to restrain."
(1983).1

Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary

"Allow," therefore, implies passive conduct, without the

necessity of knowledge.

This definition

is apparent to the

ordinary reader of common intelligence and such a reader would
understand from the ordinance that he is responsible for the
actions of his dog regardless of whether he had knowledge of those
actions.
In Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 377 N.E.2d 1208 (111. App.
1978), the defendant argued that the word, "permit," as used in a
nuisance animal ordinance implied knowledge.

The ordinance read:

"It shall be unlawful for the owner or harborer of any dog, cat or
other domestic animal to cause or permit such animal to perform,

This source cites the following as an example of how the
word may be used: "[allow] the dog to roam."
11

create or engage in any nuisance . • . ." The city argued that the
ordinance was malum prohibitum and that no proof of intent was
required.
The case was decided not on the issue of vagueness but on the
whether lack of knowledge was a defense. But the court made clear
that the use of the words "permit" or "allow" did not necessary
impose a requirement of intent.

The court compared the ordinance

in question to cases decided under state pollution control laws
which used

the word

"allow"

in relation

to

the

release of

pollutants.
In those cases, the Illinois courts held that no mens rea was
required.

In comparing the pollution cases to the animal control

ordinance, the court said:
Each measure focuses on prevention of a harmful result
which may be caused by the action of a range of persons
from by-standers to those holding legal title to the
pollutant or animal whose release would adversely affect
the environment.
Accordingly, both make punishable
passive activity by person who obtain some benefit from
the continued existence of the harmful agent.
Id. at 1213.
Similarly, it is clear that 3-1-14(a) imposes strict liability
on a person who owns or has charge, care, custody or control of a
dog which attacks a person or animal. The defendant suggests that
"allows" means "that the owner or person in control of that animal
knows what the dog is doing and is in a position to prevent such
activity."

Brief of Appellant, p. 9.

Under this interpretation,

only those rare cases could be prosecuted where the defendant was
present at the time of the attack or there was other evidence that

12

he or she intended the result*

The ordinance would have little

effect in compelling people to control the dogs for which they are
responsible*
A reader of common intelligence would realize, therefore, not
only by the common understanding of the word "allow" but by the
obvious purpose of the ordinance, that the ordinance imposes strict
liability.

Any other reading would defeat the purpose of section

3-1-14, as well as animal control ordinances in general—to compel
those having responsibility to properly restrain their dogs to
avoid the threat to public welfare of dogs running at large.
Section 3-1-14(a) makes this purpose clear to owners of dogs as
well as others who have charge, care, custody or control of a dog.
Contrary to the defendants position, intent is not an element
of all criminal offenses.
intent.
1983).

Malum prohibitum crimes do not require

Salt Lake City v. Ronnenburq. 674 P.2d 128, 129 (Utah
These types of crimes are generally "enactments passed as

police measures, regulating statutes, or statutes enacted for the
protection of public morals, public health, and the public peace
and safety."

22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 30.

Factors which favor a strict-liability construction of a law
are that the offense "creates a danger or probability of injury
which will be the same without regard to intent; that an intent or
scienter requirement would obstruct the purpose of the statute or
make it difficult to enforce; and that the accused, even if he does
not will the violation, is usually in a position to prevent it with
no more care than society might reasonably expect."
13

21 Am. Jur.

2d. Criminal Law, Section 139. The ordinance in question fulfills
each one of these criteria.
In summary, Section 3-1-14 is not void for vagueness because
the ordinance is clear to both owners of dogs and others having
charge, care, custody or control of a dog that they are strictly
liable for the actions of the dog in violation of the ordinance.
Because the language of the ordinance is clear, the defendant had
adequate notice of the prohibited conduct and the trial judge was
correct

in

applying

strict

liability

to

both

owners

and

custodians.2
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT
INTO EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATEMENT WAS
MADE WERE NEITHER CUSTODIAL NOR INTERROGATIVE.
On December 29, 1988, previous to charges being filed, the
defendant filled out a written statement which the plaintiff
introduced at trial.

Defendant claims that this statement should

have been excluded because he was not informed of his Miranda
rights.

The statement of the defendant introduced into evidence

at trial was given under circumstances to which Miranda rights
would not apply:

the statement was made under conditions which

were neither custodial nor interrogative. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
In State v. Shuman. 639 P.2d 155 (Utah 1981), the defendant
called his probation officer to report that he thought he might

The plaintifffs proposed instruction included owners and
person having charge, care, custody or control. The trial judge
determined that it was necessary to instruct only as to owners and
custodians.
14

have killed someone. Officers arrived at the defendant's apartment
to investigate. They found no evidence of a crime, but eventually
the defendant was asked to come to the sherifffs office for further
investigation. He went there willingly. In response to a question
asked by the sheriff, the defendant admitted to having been with
the victim and having been in an argument.
Eventually,

after

further

evidence was obtained

and the

defendant was advised of his Miranda rights he confessed to killing
the victim.

The defendant sought to suppress his pre-Miranda

statements.

The Utah Supreme Court held that Miranda was not

controlling because the defendant was not in custody, or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in a significant way, prior to having been
read his rights:
sheriff's

he had willingly accompanied the deputy to the

office; he was not under arrest; he was given no

indication that he would be retrained from leaving.

Id. at 157.

Similarly, the defendant in the case at hand was not in
custody.

He came to the office of Sandy City Animal Control after

an animal control officer called and asked him to come fill out a
witness statement.
convenience.

The appointment was set at the defendant's

Transcript, p. 6.

When he arrived, he came freely

through the front door to the desk where he filled
statement.

out the

Transcript, p. 16-17. He was not placed under arrest.

Transcript, p. 6.

And he was never told he could not leave.

Transcript, p. 17.

Even if the defendant had been a suspect at

this time, and is not clear that he was, "a noncustodial situation
is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because the
15

questioned person is one whom the police suspect."

State v. Cole,

674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983).
Furthermore, the environment in which the defendant wrote his
statement was not interrogative.

The officer told the defendant

that he was not "obligated to write the statement."
p. 6.

Transcript,

In fact, she give him a partial Miranda warning to stress

that he did not have to write the statement.

When the defendant

expressed some confusion about what to right in the statement, the
only guidance the officer offered was "Just write what happened
and, you know, who owns the dog and who doesnft own the dog."
Transcript, p. 7.
While the defendant was writing the statement, the officer was
in the back room "answering phones and such."

Transcript, p. 8.

The defendant even admitted that he did not write the statement in
response to any direct line of questioning:

"As she said, I didnft

know what to put down and she just said to put something down, so
I did."

Transcript, p. 15.

When the defendant was finished

writing the statement he voluntarily gave it to the officer and
left. Transcript, p. 8. It would be difficult to argue that these
circumstance rose to a level of constitutional protection.
CONCLUSION
The Brief of Appellant should be stricken because is fails to
comply with Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the defendant does not have standing to challenge
Sandy City Ordinance 3-1-14 because he has not shown that the
ordinance is either vague in all its applications or vague as to
16

the his conduct.

Even if the defendant has standing to challenge

section 3-1-14, the ordinance is not vague.

Section 3-1-14(a),

both by its language and purpose, imposes strict liability on
owners and people having charge, care, custody or control of a dog.
The trial judge, therefore, was correct in instructing the jury
that both owners and custodians were strictly liable.

The trial

judge was also correct in admitting the statement of the defendant.
Based

on the

foregoing

arguments, the plaintiff

respectfully

requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Dated this

lifly

day of February, 1990.
Respectfully Submitted,

Clifford W. Lark
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ll
mailed four copies of the foregoing
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David K. Smith
Attorney at Law
Suite 280
310 East 4500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84107
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APPENDIX
Prosecution's Exhibit No. 7, Witness Statement, Jerry Rooks.
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